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vs. ; 
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and EPSTEIN CONSTRUCTION, 
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Defendants/Appellants. 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by 
Section 78-2-2(3) (j), which gives the Supreme Court appellate 
jurisdiction over orders of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction; and Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
which allows the Supreme Court discretion to hear 
interlocutory appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: 
Does the plain language of Sections 
78-27-39 and 43, and Section 35-1-60, 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, prohibit 
-1-
inclusion of a non-party who cannot be 
named as a defendant, on a special 
verdict form for purposes of apportioning 
fault? 
Counsel agrees with Appellant Kerbs's statement of 
the standard of review. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Sections 78-27-37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended. Sections 3 5-1-60 and 62, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee agrees with the Statement of the Case in 
Appellant Kerbs's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant Epstein Construction, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Epstein") was construction manager with respect to a 
remodelling project at Albertsons' North Salt Lake 
Distribution Center, which project included installation of 
new banana storage rooms (R., at 2-3; 265). Epstein 
subcontracted with Appellant Kerbs Construction Corporation 
(hereinafter "Kerbs") for work which included cutting a trench 
in the concrete floor of the Distribution Center for purposes 
of placing utility lines and the banana room walls (R. , at 
266) . 
Appellee Jodie Dahl was an employee of Albertsons 
and, on February 14, 1989, during the course of her 
employment, fell backward over the trench, suffering serious 
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and permanent injuries, including a herniated disc and other 
physical complications• (R. , at 3). Ms. Dahl received 
workers compensation benefits for her injuries. (R., at 3). 
Ms. Dahl filed suit for her injuries against Kerbs 
and Epstein. (R., at 1-4). Kerbs and Epstein alleged, inter 
alia, comparative negligence on the part of Ms. Dahl and her 
employer, Albertsons, (R., at 13-17), and filed motions 
seeking the inclusion of Albertsons on the special verdict 
form. (R. , at 565). Judge Cornaby at first granted this 
motion, but upon reconsideration, he reversed himself and 
refused to permit the fault of Albertsons to be assessed 
pursuant to Section 78-27-39, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
(R., at 749-750). This interlocutory appeal followed, and the 
trial in this case has been stayed pending the decision of 
this appeal. (R., at 978-979 and 982-983). 
Appellee submits that these are the relevant facts 
necessary to resolve this appeal, that the Statement of Facts 
in Appellant Kerbs's Brief is unnecessarily long, and goes 
more to the merits of the case than to the facts necessary to 
resolve the appeal, and, accordingly, requests this Court to 
disregard the lengthy Statement of Facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There is no conflict between the plain language of 
Utah's Comparative Negligence Statutes and the Utah's Worker's 
Compensation Act. The former expressly and repeatedly 
-3-
excludes employers from inclusion as parties defendant and 
from inclusion on special verdict forms for purposes of fault 
determination. The Comparative Negligence Statutes also 
expressly recognize the statutory immunity from liability of 
employers under the Utah's Worker's Compensation Act. 
By recognizing an employer's immunity from suit and 
from apportionment of fault in the Comparative Fault statutes, 
our legislature has determined that the strong policies 
underlying the Worker's Compensation Act merit the immunity 
given to employers. To adopt Appellants' position would not 
only result in a judicial rewriting of these statutes, but 
would undermine the purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act 
and the manner in which employers function under it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SECTIONS 78-27-39 
AND 43, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, AS AMENDED, 
PRECLUDES A NON-DEFENDANT FROM BEING 
INCLUDED ON A SPECIAL VERDICT FORM FOR 
PURPOSES OF APPOINTING FAULT. 
Utah's Comparative Fault Statutes, Sections 78-27-37 
through 43, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, set forth a 
tightly worded scheme by which the comparative fault of 
defendants, and only defendants, may be assessed (emphasis 
added). Section 78-27-37 defines a "defendant" as "any person 
not immune from suit..." (emphasis added). Section 78-27-38 
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provides that no defendant is liable in excess of the 
proportion of fault of that defendant (emphasis added). 
Section 78-27-39 provides: 
The trial court may, and when 
requested by any party shall, direct the 
jury, if any, to find separate special 
verdicts determining the total amount of 
damages sustained and the percentage or 
proportion of fault attributable to each 
person seeking recovery and to each 
defendant, (emphasis added). 
It is a general principle of statutory construction 
that, unless technical terms are used, words employed in a 
statute must be given their usual and ordinary meaning. Cache 
Auto Co. v. Central Garage, 63 Utah 10, 221 P.862 (1923). In 
construing a statute, all words are presumed to have been used 
advisedly. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co. , 777 P. 2d 428 (Utah 
1989) . 
Appellants' argue that there is some form of 
inequity in the Comparative Fault Statutes and some perceived 
conflict with the Worker's Compensation Act. They concede 
that the plain language of the Comparative Fault Statutes 
limits special verdict forms to apportionment of fault among 
plaintiff and defendants, but argue that this was not really 
the intended result. However, "the best evidence of the true 
intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act is 
the plain language of the Act," Jensen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984). 
Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
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provides that ".•.no action at law may be maintained against 
an employer... based upon any accident, injury or death of any 
employee." This immunity from suit is recognized explicitly 
in Section 78-27-43, which provides: 
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 
78-27-42 affects or impairs any common 
law or statutory immunity from liability, 
including, but not limited to... the 
exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter 1, 
Title 35...(emphasis added). 
Thus, what our legislature has done in creating the 
scheme of our Comparative Fault Statutes, is provide for 
apportionment of fault among those persons or entities who can 
be sued as defendants. Liability is no longer joint and 
several; it is apportioned. But employers are excluded 
expressly and repeatedly from this apportionment because of 
the strong policies underlying the no-fault theory of worker's 
compensation, as will be more fully argued under Point III 
below. Since Albertsons is immune from suit under Sections 
78-27-43, and 35-1-60, it cannot be a defendant, and hence 
cannot be included on a special verdict form. 
Additionally, Section 78-27-41 provides: 
A person seeking recovery, or any 
defendant who is a party to the 
litigation, may join as parties any 
defendants who may have caused or 
contributed to the injury or damage for 
which recovery is sought, for the purpose 
of having determined their respective 
proportions of fault. (emphasis added). 
Given this specific statute, if the Legislature had intended 
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to allow inclusion of immune employers on the special verdict 
forms, it would have stated so explicitly. 
Appellants rely principally on case law from Idaho 
and Wisconsin, claiming that Utah's Comparative Fault Statute 
is modeled after the statutory schemes of those states. 
Utah's Comparative Negligence Act was adopted in 1973, and the 
cases cited by Appellants from the other jurisdictions were 
decided subsequent to that date [Beringer v. State, 727 P.2d 
1222 (Idaho 1986) (Kerbs's Brief, at p.17); Pocatello 
Industrial Park Company v. Steel West. Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 
621 P.2d 399 (1980) (Kerbs's Brief, at p. 16 and Epstein's 
Brief at pp.10,13); Connar v. West Shore Equipment of 
Milwaukee, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1975) (Epstein's Brief, 
at p.9)]. However, in Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc.. 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the presumption that the Legislature intended to adopt 
Idaho's judicial interpretations along with its Comparative 
Negligence Statute, does not apply to Idaho court decisions 
subsequent to the 1973 date of adoption. 679 P. 2d 903, at 
905. 
Furthermore, Utah's Comparative Negligence Act was 
repealed in 1986, and replaced with the Liability Reform Act, 
current Section 78-27-37 through 43. Stephens v. Henderson, 
741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987). The Liability Reform Act's language 
changed the wording concerning who could be included on 
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special verdict forms from determining the*negligence of "each 
party" (language of the former Comparative Negligence Act) to 
determining "the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to... each defendant." By changing this wording, 
the Legislature has evidenced an intent to include only 
plaintiffs and defendants on the special verdict form, and any 
Idaho judicial interpretations may and should be disregarded. 
Jensen, supra. 
Other courts have interpreted their comparative 
fault or negligence statutes in this manner. In Warmbradt v. 
Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282 (Nev. 1984), the Nevada Supreme Court 
observed that where the plain language of the comparative 
negligence statute required apportioning liability "among the 
defendants" and returning a special verdict indicating the 
percentage of negligence . "attributable to each party", no 
reference was made to the negligence of other possible persons 
or entities. The court held that the jury should not have 
been instructed to consider the negligence of one who was 
neither a defendant nor a party. 
In Mihov v. Proulx, 113 N.H.698, 313 A.2d 723 
(1973), the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that their 
statute spoke only in terms of actual defendants, and not in 
terms of other tortfeasors who were potential defendants, but 
immune because of a covenant not to sue. This court held 
that, under those circumstances, the defendant may not implead 
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a third party as codefendant for purposes of apportioning 
liability. It is submitted that a tortfeasor who is protected 
by a covenant not to sue is analogous to an employer granted 
immunity by the Worker's Compensation Act. 
In Kelly v. Carborundum Company, 453 A.2d 624 (Pa. 
Super. 1982), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held, in an 
action by an employee against a third-party tortfeasor, that 
the employer could not be joined either as an additional 
defendant or as an involuntary plaintiff for purposes of 
apportioning fault under Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence 
Act, which provided: 
...[w]here recovery is allowed 
against more than one defendant, each 
defendant shall be liable for proportion 
of the total dollar amount awarded as 
damages in the ratio of the amount of his 
causal negligence to the amount of causal 
negligence attributed to all defendants 
against whom recovery is allowed... 42 
Pa.C.S.A. Section 7102. 453 A.2d 624, at 
627. 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held: 
Contrary to the premise for 
appellant's argument, this statute does 
not provide for apportionment among all 
tortfeasors causally responsible for an 
injury. "It merely provides for 
apportionment among those defendants 
against whom recovery is allowed. There 
is no suggestion in that statute that all 
possible tortfeasors be brought into 
court, and certainly no requirement that 
this be done to achieve the purposes of 
the act. The trier of fact is simply to 
apportion liability on a percentage basis 
among those defendants on the record 
against whom recovery is allowed..." 
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[citation omitted]. We observed in 
Heckendorn, and repeat here, that under 
existing law, an employer is not a 
defendant "against whom recovery is 
allowed.11 453 A. 2d 624, at 627 (emphasis 
added). 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court had already held, in 
Heckendorn v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 293 Pa. Super 
474, 439 A.2d 674 (1982), that an employer who accepts the 
responsibility of providing worker's compensation benefits is 
not a party whose negligence is to be included in the 
apportionment required by the Comparative Negligence Law. The 
Kelly court then held: 
It seems clear, therefore, that 
substantive law precludes the joinder of 
an employer for the purpose of 
determining fault in an action commenced 
by an employee against a third person. 
453 A.2d, 624, at 627. 
This reasoning is applicable equally to Utah's current 
statutory scheme. 
In Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d 603 (Ore. 1987), .The 
Oregon Supreme Court interpreted its comparative negligence 
statute, which provided for special verdicts determining the 
"degree of each party's fault expressed as a percentage of the 
total fault attributable to all parties represented in the 
action." The court confined the determination to the actual 
named parties, relying on the plain language of the Oregon 
statute. In so holding, the Oregon Supreme Court declined to 
follow the reasoning of the following cases cited by 
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Appellants: Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee, 68 
Wis.2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660 (1975) (Epstein's Brief at p.9); 
Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 
783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980) (Kerbs's Brief at p. 16; Epstein's 
Brief at pp. 10,13); Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 
(1978) (Epstein's Brief at pp.11,15). 
Most of the cases cited by Appellants do not 
actually support their position that Utah's statutes require 
an immune employer's include on the special verdict form. 
Appellants' cited cases fall into the following five 
categories: 
(1) The statutory language being construed 
expressly directed the inclusion of immune employers: 
Williams v. White Mountain Construction Company, 749 P.2d 423 
(Colo. 1988), see excerpts from Section 13-21-111.5(1), 6A 
C.R.S. (1987) in Addendum; Dietz v. General Electric Company, 
821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991), A.R.S. Section 12-2506, requiring 
considering fault of "all persons who have contributed to the 
alleged injury... regardless of whether the person was, or 
could have been, named as a party to the suit..." and that 
percentage of fault assessed against such "nonparties are used 
only as a vehicle for accurately determining the fault of the 
named parties..."; Leonard v. Johns Manville Sales Corp.. 305 
S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1983), N.C.G.S. 97-10.2 expressly allows for 
inclusion of immune employer and permits employer to defend; 
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Clark v. Pacificorp. . 116 Washed 804, 809 P.2d 176 (1991) , 
RCW 4.22.070: "In all actions involving fault of more than 
one entity, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage 
of the total fault which is attributable to every entity which 
caused the claimant's damages, including the claimant... third 
party defendants... [and] entities immune from liability." 
(emphasis added). In these cases, the various courts were 
construing plain language conspicuously absent from and 
different than the relevant Utah statutes. 
(2) The statutory language expressly 
disallowed inclusion of employers: Huber v. Henley, 656 
F.Supp. 508 (S.D. Ind. 1987). In this case, the issue was 
inclusion of a subdivision of the state, not otherwise immune, 
but against which the statute of limitations had run. The 
relevant Indiana statute permitted joinder of a "nonparty" to 
determine comparative fault. Indiana Code 34-4-2 (a) provided: 
"Nonparty" means a person who is, or may 
be, liable to the claimant in part or in 
whole for the damages claimed but who has 
not been joined in the action as a 
defendant by the claimant. A nonparty 
shall not include the employer of the 
claimant. (emphasis added). 
(3) Cases in which the decision did not deal 
with the issue of inclusion of an employer: Kirby Building 
Systems v. Mineral Explorations, 704 P.2d 1266 (Wyo. 1985). 
This was a business tort case, but in discussing the statutes, 
the court noted that Wyoming's comparative negligence statute 
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allowed joinder of anyone against whom plaintiff could seek 
judgment. In Utah, this would not include an employer. 
(4) Cases in which ambiguities in that state's 
comparative negligence statute only were resolved by judicial 
decisions permitting inclusion of an employer, without a 
discussion of the immunity issue: Pape v. Kansas Power & 
Light Co.. 231 Kan. 441, 647 P.2d 320 (1982); Taylor v. 
Delqarno, 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983); Hall v. Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co. , 142 111. App.3d 200, 491 N.E.2d 879 
(1986). 
(5) Cases which allow consideration of an 
employer's fault, but with statutory language greatly 
different from Utah's: Connar v. West Shore Equipment of 
Milwaukee, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1975); Bode v. Clark 
Equipment Co., 719 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1986). 
In none of the cited cases in Appellants' Briefs is 
there a statutory scheme similar to Sections 78-27-37 through 
43. All of the Appellants' cited cases in (3) through (5) of 
Appellee's five designated categories, dealt with the issue of 
permitting third party claims of contribution from negligent 
employers under state comparative negligence statutes. As 
noted by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Williams v. White 
Mountain Construction Company, supra, the great majority does 
not permit a claim for contribution against the employer: 
... In states with statutory schemes 
similar to that of Colorado, the majority 
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rule is to prohibit such claims. This 
rule fulfills the twin public policy 
goals of speedy, predictable 
determination of job-related injuries and 
a reluctance to create a judicial remedy 
that invades the province of the 
legislature. 749 P.2d 423, at 428. 
In footnote 5 of Williams, the Colorado Supreme Court mentions 
that this is the rule in the federal courts and in thirty-four 
states. See also, Annotation, Modern Status of Effect of 
State Workmen's Compensation Act on Right of Third-Person 
Tortfeasor to Contribution or Indemnity from Employer of 
Injured or Killed Workman, 100 A.L.R.3d 350, 356-364 (1980). 
Thus, the cases cited by Appellants are, largely, 
distinguishable, and those few supporting their position are 
clearly the minority viewpoint. Even among those few, the 
statutory scheme is different from Utah's. Our legislature 
did not intend the inclusion of employers on the special 
verdict forms. 
POINT II: APPELLEE'S EMPLOYER'S (ALBERTSONS) 
IMMUNITY THROUGH WORKER'S COMPENSATION 
PAYMENTS EXTENDS TO THE APPORTIONMENT OF 
FAULT. 
Ms. Dahl received worker's compensation benefits for 
her injuries. Nothing in Utah's Comparative Fault Statutes 
"affects or impairs any... statutory immunity from liability, 
including... the exclusive remedy provisions of Chapter 1, 
Title 35." Section 78-27-43. 
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Section 35-1-60 provides: 
The right to recover compensation 
pursuant to the provisions of this title 
for injuries sustained by an employee... 
shall be the exclusive remedy against the 
employer... and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this act shall be in 
place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever. 
See also, Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P. 2d 428 (Utah 
1989) . It is submitted that the Liability Reform Act of 1986 
does not affect Albertson's immunity, and that this extends to 
liability from apportionment of fault. 
Courts of other states have so held. In Cordier v. 
Stetson-Ross, Inc.. 704 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1979), the Montana 
Supreme Court followed the majority rule and held that an 
employer, immune from liability under worker's compensation 
statutes, is not liable to a third party for contribution. 
The court relied on Montana's worker's compensation statutes, 
which are similar to Utah's: 
It is the intent and purpose of the 
Worker's Compensation Act that the right 
of action against a responsible third 
party belongs to the employee. 
Consequently, it is uniformly held that 
the employer's contributory negligence 
may not be used as a defense in an action 
by the injured employee against the 
responsible party... 
Therefore, under the Montana scheme, 
the negligence, if any, of the employer 
(but not of the employee himself) never 
becomes an issue in the injured 
employee's action against a responsible 
third party. His right to recover 
damages is determined without reference 
to his employer's negligence... 
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While this may result in a 
"negligent" employer profiting through 
subrogation, the employee's cause of 
action cannot be split. In choosing 
between two possible injustices, allowing 
a negligent employer to profit, or 
reducing the recovery allowed to an 
injured employee, the Montana legislature 
has opted in favor of the employee by 
providing him full recovery. 604 P. 2d 
86, at 93. 
Another case with a similar holding is Correia v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033 
(1983). In Correia, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts had to 
deal with an "equitable" solution proposed by the third-party 
tortfeasor to the supposed inequity of not allowing 
contribution from the employer. This proposed "equitable" 
solution was similar to that suggested in the present case by 
Appellants. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held: 
...Similar solutions have been proposed 
without success in a number of other 
states where the workmen's compensation 
statutes have been construed to bar 
contribution against the employer 
[citation omitted]. A common ground for 
the decisions denying equitable 
solutions, aside from difficulties with 
the solutions themselves, has been that 
the workmen's compensation laws are 
economic regulations representing the 
Legislature's balance of competing 
societal interest and that the courts 
have no place in reshaping public policy 
in the face of such comprehensive 
legislation [citations omitted]. We 
accepted this rationale in Westerlind... 
we think its rationale extends to 
preclude our making any decision here in 
the name of equity which would undercut 
the legislative scheme... Workmen's 
compensation is not an area so "long left 
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to the common law [that] change may come 
about by the same medium of 
development... 446 N.E.2d 1033, at 1036-
1037. 
Other cases supporting this position include: 
Seattle First National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete, 588 P.2d 
1308 (Wash. 1978); Therrien v. Safeguard Manufacturing 
Company, 35 Conn. Supp. 268, 408 A.2d 273 (1979); Thompson v. 
Stearns Chemical Corp.. 345 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1984); and 
Gernand v. Ost Services. Inc., 298 N.W.2d 500 (N.D. 1980). 
POINT III ADOPTION OF APPELLANTS' POSITION WOULD 
UNDERMINE THE PURPOSES OF UTAH'S WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION STATUTES. 
Appellee's main argument is, as set forth in Point 
I above, that the plain language of the relevant Utah statutes 
precludes a "non-defendant" from being included on special 
verdict forms. Nonetheless, Appellants raise certain policy 
arguments, most notably the feared "double recovery" of an 
employee (Epstein's Brief, at pp.16-17). This fear is not 
only unfounded but, if anything, it is the employee who would 
not recover fully and the employer who would benefit. 
Appellant Epstein argues that under Utah's worker's 
compensation benefits, an employee is reimbursed for most if 
not all economic losses, e.g., lost wages. Actually, as is 
well known, employees may recover only up to two-thirds of 
their lost wages, Section 3 5-1-65, to a maximum of 100 percent 
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of the state's average weekly wage. A similar limit is set on 
permanent wage loss, Section 35-1-67. There are limits of a 
maximum of six years, and two-thirds wage loss on permanent 
partial disability, Section 35-1-66, and two-thirds wage loss 
on permanent total disability, Section 35-1-67. An injured 
worker does not recover any general damages for pain and 
suffering. An injured worker earning $1,000.00 per week can 
only recover two-thirds up to about $2 3 7.00 per week, 
currently, on lost wages. Regardless of the employer's or 
worker's fault, the employer or its insurance carrier is 
reimbursed dollar-for-dollar out of any third-party recovery 
of the injured worker, Section 35-1-62. 
This entire scheme is a considered legislative 
judgment. The injured worker benefits by receiving a speedy 
payment for his or her injuries. The worker does not have to 
prove employer fault and, in fact, may often recover even if 
the worker was at fault. The worker does not have to go 
through the protracted litigation process. But the worker 
does not receive the type or full amount of damages available 
in an action at law against the employer. 
On the other side, the employer benefits by paying 
less than it would in a law action if it were at fault. The 
tradeoff is that the employer pays even if it is not at all at 
fault. As an overall benefit and tradeoff, the employer is 
reimbursed out of the third party recovery. 
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Adoption of the Appellants' position would upset 
this balancing of interests by the legislature. The injured 
employee would still have to reimburse the employer from his 
or her third-party recovery, so it would be the employer who 
benefitted by its own fault-based conduct, not the employee. 
And the employer would be a phantom entity in the third party 
litigation - its fault would be determined, but it would not 
be there to assert its own position. Neither would the 
employer have any motivation to be involved in the third-party 
suit. The employer still is reimbursed, Section 35-1-62, and 
there is no right of contribution, Section 78-27-40. Thus, 
adopting Appellants' policy argument would require not just 
ignoring the plain language of Sections 78-27-37 through 43, 
but a judicial rewriting of Section 35-1-62. 
Addressing this issue, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, in Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
supra, observed: 
As an example of the unfairness of 
the rule [of excessive plaintiff's 
recovery], Firestone presents the 
scenario of a third party whose 
negligence contributed only one percent 
to the employee's damages, nevertheless 
having to pay full damages in the event 
that the employee's negligence was no 
greater than that of the third party. 
While we consider such a result harsh, we 
can conceive of instances where, under 
the first three instructions suggested by 
Firestone, an employee whose negligence 
was minimal or nonexistent would be 
denied recovery or receive substantially 
less than he would have had he not 
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received workmen's compensation. 
Moreover, we are not. so naive as to fail 
to acknowledge that one of the practical 
effects of Westerlind is to favor one 
insurance company (the employer's 
carrier) over another insurance company 
(the third party's carrier). 446 N.E.2d 
1033, at 1036, n.5. 
Since Utah's Worker's Compensation statutes are 
premised on a no-fault concept, if an employer's right to 
reimbursement under Section 35-1-62 were subject to a credit 
or set-off for the employer's apportioned share of fault, the 
employer would be motivated to contest the worker's 
compensation claim by showing fatult on the part of the 
employee, so as to protect its right to reimbursement. 
Finally, Epstein's position, at p.18 of its Brief, 
that "a subrogee must not himself be at fault or contributing 
to the loss on which he sues," is erroneous for two reasons. 
First, since the employer is not and cannot be a party to the 
third-party tort litigation, it is not bound by any 
apportioned fault or any res judicata aspect of the judgment. 
Second, the employer's right to reimbursement is based upon 
statute, and fault has nothing to do with it, Section 35-1-
62(2) . 
CONCLUSION 
Our legislature has expressed its considered 
decision in the Liability Reform and Worker's Compensation 
Acts. The plain language of the former shows that the 
legislature intended that employers who are immune from suit, 
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because of worker's compensation payments, not be included on 
the special verdict forms. To allow their inclusion would 
undermine the no-fault and other policies of the worker's 
compensation statutes, and would amount to a rewriting of 
those statutes, and the comparative fault statutes by the 
judiciary. Judge Cornaby's ruling should be affirmed, and 
this Court should lift the stay on the trial date and remand 
this case for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 
1992. 
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James R. Hasenyager 
Martin W. Custen 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM - A 
[pMI(gHD 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUIfi 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
V. 
Jlt!'i 
JODIE DAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KERBS CONSTRUCTION, et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE ALBERTSONS 
Civil No, 900746945 
The plaintiff has moved to exclude Albertsons from the 
special verdict form. The defendants oppose the motion. 
On February 26, 1991, Epstein Construction moved the Court 
to include Albertsons on the special verdict form. On March 13, 
1991, Kerbs Construction Company joined in that motion. On 
March 13, 1991, the Court received Epstein's notice to submit 
for decision. The motion was supported by a brief that was well 
reasoned and supported by law from both Idaho and Wisconsin. 
Since the plaintiff apparently was not objecting the Court 
granted the motion. 
The rule of law involved has not been adjudicated in Utah. 
Albertsons is not a party to the action and cannot be made one 
because of the Workman's Compensation law. Apparently, the 
majority of jurisdictions would exclude Albertsons from the 
special verdict form because it is not a party and cannot be 
made a party. On the other hand, Idaho and Wisconsin rule that 
the fault of all persons contributing to an accident should "be 
presented to the jury under comparative negligence law. 
The plaintiff was not diligent in responding to defendants7 
motion to include Albertsons. Yet, the legal position of the 
plaintiff appears more reasonable to the Court. The defendants 
point out that there is no such thing as a motion f0r 
reconsideration in Utah. This rule works well when the Court 
has made factual findings, but not so well when, as here, no one 
is hurt by the application of the better reasoned law. 
In spite of the Court's prior ruling, it now rules that 
Albertsons shall be excluded from the special jury verdict. 
Regardless of the outcome of the case, the plaintiff's attorney 
is responsible for defendants' attorney fees in conjunction with 
responding to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. 
The plaintiff is directed to file a formal order with the 
Court• 
Dated June 27, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: ' 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to: 
James R. Hasenyager 
2661 Washington Blvd., Suite 202 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Gary D. Stott 
George T. Naegle 
P. O. Box 2465 
SLC, UT 84110-2465 
J. Nick Crawford 
3rd Floor 
39 Post Office Place 
SLC, UT 84101-2104 
Dated th is JUi day of June 1991, 
Deputy Clferk 
STATUTES 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, 
agent or employee — Occupational disease ex-
cepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for 
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal rep-
resentatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall 
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the indus-
trial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provi-
sions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917, Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, 
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. § 35-2-1 et seq. 
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § L Meaning of " th is act". — See the note un-
Cross-References. — Employment of chil- der the same catchline following § 35-1-46. 
dren, § 34-23-1 et seq. 
78-27-37. Definitions. 
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission 
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all 
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, 
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and 
misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, oTon behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representative. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § i. relating to 
1986, ch. 199, § I. dimimshment of damages and assumption of 
Repeals and Reenactmcnts. — Laws 1986. risk, and rccnacts the above section, 
ch. 1989, § 1 repeals former § 78-27-37, as en-
78-27-38. C o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e . 
o ^ n f a R U ° f a P e r S ° " S e r k l f i e r e C ° V e r y S h a " n o t a I o n G b a r recovery by that 
£ J i e , 7 r e C ° V ^ f r ° m " ^ d e f e n d « t or group of defendants whose 
r e c L ™ I ° W n H ° W e V e r ' n ° d e f e n d ^ t is liable to any person seeking 
that defe d T ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ° f * * p r o P o r t l o n o f * « " attributable tf 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L. 
1986, ch . 199, § 2. 
Repea ls and Reenac tmen t s . — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to 
special verdicts, and reenacts the above sec-
tion. 
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act, 
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration 
or modification of product after sale is substan-
tial contributing cause of injury, § 78-15-5. 
Skiers not to make claim against or recover 
from ski area operator for injury resulting from 
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53. 
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and 
proportion of fault. 
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury, 
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of dam-
ages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each 
person seeking recovery and to each defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enac ted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 3. 
Repeals and Reenac tmen t s . — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 3, relating to 
contribution among joint tortfeasors, and reen-
-acts*the above section. 
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault 
— No contribution. 
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be 
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the 
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that 
defendant No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 4. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 4 repeals former § 78-27-40, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 4, relating to 
settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts 
the above section. 
Cross-References. — Enforcement of con-
tribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 69(h). 
Joint obligations, § 15-4-i et seq. 
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants. 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation, 
may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having 
determined their respective proportions of fault 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-41, enac ted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 5. 
Repeals and Reenac tments . — Laws 1986, 
ch 199, § 5 repeals former § 78-27-41, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch 209 § 5, relating to 
rights of contribution and indemnity, and reen-
acts the above section 
78-27-42- Release to one defendant does not discharge 
other defendants. 
A release'given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does 
not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-42, enacted by L. 
1986, clu 199, 5 6. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 6 repeals former § 78-27-42, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 6, relating to 
release of joint tortfeasors and a reduction of 
claim, and reenacts the above section, 
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indem-
nity, contribution. 
Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common 
law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not IimitecLto *ov-
ernmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63, and the exclusive 
T^T? 0 0 8 °f C h a p t e r h TiUe 35' N ° t h i n g ln §§ 78-27-37 through 
lanii^ 7 TalrS ^ F i g h t to i n d e m n ^ or contribution arising trom statute, contract, or agreement. 6 
History: C 1953, 78-27-43, enacted by L. 
1986, ch- 199, 5 7. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 199, § 7 repeals former § 78-27-43, as en-
acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 7, relating to 
release of joint tortfeasors and contribution, 
and reenacts the above section. 
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1986. ch. 
, 19?, § 9 provided "If any provision of 
§§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, or the applica-
tion of any provisions of those sections to any 
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the re-
maining provisions of those sections shall be 
given effect without the invalid provision or 
application." 
ADDENDUM - C 
TITLE 13. COURTS AND COURT PROCEDURE 
DAMAGES 
DAMAGES 
ARTICLE 21. DAMAGES 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
C.R.S. 13-21-111.5 (1991) 
21-111.5. Civil liability cases - pro rata liability of defendants 
1) In an action brought as a result of a death or an injury to person or 
erty, no defendant shall be liable for an amount greater than that 
esented by the degree or percentage of the negligence or fault attributable 
uch defendant that produced the claimed injury, death, damage, or loss, 
pt as provided in subsection (4) of this section. 
2) The jury shall return a special verdict, or, in the absence of a jury, 
court shall make special findings determining the percentage of negligence 
ault attributable to each of the parties and any persons not parties to the 
on of whom notice has been given pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (3) 
.his section to whom some negligence or fault is found and determining the 
il amount of damages sustained by each cLaimant. The entry of judgment shall 
lade by the court based on the special findings, and no general verdict shall 
returned by the jury. 
;3) (a) Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the finder 
fact in a civil action may consider the degree or percentage of negligence or 
Lt of a person not a party to the action, based upon evidence thereof, which 
LI be admissible, in determining the degree or percentage of negligence or 
Lt of those persons who are parties to such action. Any finding of a degree 
percentage of fault or negligence of a nonparty shall not constitute a 
sumptive or conclusive finding as to such nonparty for the purposes of a 
Dr or subsequent action involving that nonparty. 
(b) Negligence or fault of a nonparty may be considered if the claimant 
ered into a settlement agreement with the nonparty or if the defending party 
es notice that a nonparty was wholly or partially at fault within ninety days 
lowing commencement of the action unless the court determines that a longer 
iod is necessary. The notice shall be given by filing a pleading in the 
ion designating such nonparty and setting forth such nonparty's name and 
t-known address, or the best identification of such nonparty which is 
sible under the circumstances, together with a brief statement of the basis 
believing such nonparty to be at fault. Designation of a nonparty shall be 
>ject to the provisions of section 13-17-102. If the designated nonparty is a 
ensed health care professional and the defendant designating such nonparty 
eges professional negligence by such nonparty, the requirements and 
>cedures of section 13-20-602 shall apply. 
